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John Marshall Harlan:
The Justice and the Man
By HENRY J.

ABRAHAM*

I
THE FIGURE

emerging from these pages is that of a -Southern

gentleman of the nineteenth century-absolute confidence in the
correctness of his own views, a firm belief that it is possible for
human beings clearly to discern between right and wrong, and
an inability to understand, once he had made this distinction in
favor of the "right", how any reasonable man could disagree with
him. But if this was all there was to John Marshall Harlan-a
statue marked "Soldier, scholar, jurist-God was his only Master"
-his memory might better be served by salutory neglect. That,
however, is not the case. For in the 46 years that separate us
from the death of this eminent jurist we have seen many of his
dissents become the majority opinion of the Court. We have, in
many ways, grown into the picture he drew of us.
Justice Harlan is depicted by his contemporaries as anything
but a negotiator or compromiser. He was viewed as a militant
individualist, "in questions concerning civil rights ... inflexible",'
a dissenter "to the queen's taste."2 Harlan saw this love of personal freedom as a positive good in itself; its application to constitutional interpretation forms a vital part of his philosophy.
Thus, he insisted upon the constitutional equality of minority
groups-no matter what their race-the undiluted freedom of
speech and of the press, the freedom of sailors to terminate their
* Associate Professor in Political Science, Wharton School of Finance and
Commerce, University of Pennsylvania. This article was prepared with the assistance of Rita Bocher and Robert Stern and other members of the author's graduate Seminar in Constitutional Law.
117 Va. L. Reg. 497 (1911).
2 51 Cosmopolitan 534 (1911).
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employment as other citizens could, and constitutional guarantees
to the peoples of America's newly-won colonies. He challenged
the authority of his colleagues to select what rights will or will
not be guaranteed; and, in general, he held the firm conviction
that neither the national government, nor the state governments,
nor individual persons, could with impunity deprive citizens of
the United States of those rights guaranteed by the whole federal
Constitution. His position on civil rights is perhaps inflexible, perhaps unmindful of the reciprocity of rights and duties that exists
between a citizen and his government, and the fact that rights
are not absolute but must be judged in the context in which
they are exercised. Yet he recognized the dangers that are inherent in rationalizing restrictions-his age, and our age, are replete with the dire results of pandering individual liberties to the
expediency of statecraft. Harlan rejected expediency; his concern
lay rather with the Constitution which he revered, and with his
own conception of the Union as a strong servant and protector of
individual rights. There was much of the Jeffersonian Democrat
in this ante-bellum slaveholder. His focus was unmistakably on
the individual. In an age of rapidly growing domestic commerce,
and commerce that sought for overseas empire, when laissez-faire
enthusiasm too often read life and liberty out of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments in favor of an almost unassailable right
to property protection, Harlan stood firm on principles laid down
at an earlier time. He left his ringing dissents to become the law
for future generations.
Harlan sought to retain a balance between the power of the
states and the power of the national government. But his view
of the scope of federal control was much more nearly akin to
Chief Justice Marshall than to that of his own contemporaries.
Today we have returned to his view. His dissents in favor of
national taxation and federal control of interstate commerce, for
example, ultimately prevailed in an amendment establishing
federal income taxation, and in the complete reversal of the Knight
doctrine.' Although he claimed to be an adherent to a strict interpretation of the Constitution-and was that, indeed, in matters
concerning civil liberties-he saw the economic life of the Nation
3

United States v. E. C. Knight Corp., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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as a primary concern of the national government. Hence, he
sought to give it "the widest grant of power-consistent with the
language employed and what he deemed the fundamental intent
behind it".4
Harlan's approach to the law was free from casuistry, equivocation and quibble. His disdain for metaphysics rendered yeoman
service toward discrediting the "natural law" philosophy that was
espoused by many of his confreres. His abhorrence for overt
"judicial legislation" called forth some of his most heated rebukes
against the majority, and some of his most fervid defenses of
what he viewed as the right of the legislators, rather than the
judges, to make the laws of the land.
His eulogizers have pictured him as a mind ... more rugged
than keen.. .",5 a viewer of the law "who . . . approached...
the layman",, and a constant warrior of "mind with mind . . .
carried on, not with adroit fence at subtle play of reason, but with
a directness and entire disregard of all narrower points of view."7
But perhaps it was this simple, direct approach to the law
that allowed him to grasp the picture of a growing economy that
could only be effectively regulated by the national government:
Giant corporations doing a nationwide, some a worldwide, business that were entities of the individual states in legal fiction only;
businesses upon whose prosperity the prosperity of the nation was
growing more and more dependent, and with whose fortunes the
general welfare was inextricably tied. Perhaps it was his avoidance of legal circumlocution that permitted him to see through
the maze of split-hairs and chopped-logic to say that American
democracy has no place for a half-way house between slavery and
citizenship.
Perhaps his temperament was more suited for the forum than
for the bench, as many of his critics noted. But it is nonetheless
a temperament without which free institutions cannot surviveone characterized by militancy, strength, imagination, and the
courage to stand alone.
4 30 A.B.A.J. 576 (October 1944).

5 23 Green Bag 654 (1911).
6 8 Dictionary of American Biography 269.
7 Eulogy delivered by Chief Justice Edward D. White, quoted in 195 North
American Review 288 (1912).
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John Marshall Harlan was born on June 1, 1833, in Boyle
County, Kentucky, the son of James Harlan, a politically influential Kentuckian.
Young Harlan grew up in that period of American history
which was marked by the growing estrangement of the South and
the Union. It was a time in which abolitionist feeling ran high
in the North, and the South moved ever closer to secession. Kentucky, as a border state, was sharply divided. With his civic
background, the young man quite naturally entered the study of
law. He received his A.B. degree from Centre College, and three
years later, at twenty, completed his law courses at Transylvania
University. In that same year he was admitted to the Kentucky
bar.
John Marshall Harlan participated actively in the bitter
political struggles which racked the country on the eve of the
Civil War. In 1859 he ran for Congress on the Opposition ticket
against the Democrats in the Ashland District of Kentucky, but
was defeated by a small margin. A Southern gentleman and
slaveholder, and at heart a conservative, he was unwilling to
enter into the Republican party. In the critical presidential campaign of 1860, he did not support Lincoln, the Republican candidate, but served instead as an elector on the ticket of the Constitutional Union party which was headed by Bell and Everett.
The Union party platform sought the peaceful preservation of the
status quo and was known as the "peace" ticket.
Harlan moved to Louisville in 1861 where he practiced law
with W. F. Bullock.' As the war clouds darkened, many observers
realized that there was no way to avoid conflict if the Union
troops, which were then occupying the Southern forts in increasing number, were not removed. Harlan believed that war was
inevitable as long as these troops remained in the South; and he
contended that if war came, the border states would be sure to
leave the Union. On April 12, 1861, Fort Sumter was fired upon;
war had begun. On April 15, Lincoln called on Kentucky for four
8
It was stated in 1 National Cyclopedia of American Biography 34 that
Harlan went to Louisiana to practice law with W.F. Bullock. But the mass of
evidence indicates that both men were in Louisville on the eve of the Civil War
and conducted their practice in that city.
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regiments of troops. The legislature not being in session, Governor Magoffin defiantly replied that Kentucky would furnish no
troops for the purpose of subduing her sister Southern States.
The Southern Rights men were in favor of seceding from the
Union immediately, but the great body of Kentuckians were opposed to such drastic action. A strong desire for a peaceful settlement of the problem remained Kentucky's hope.
Harlan subsequently abandoned the position of the Constitutional Union Party, which had joined with the Douglas faction
in rejecting secession, but which refused to give military aid to
the Union. When Kentucky thus refused to furnish troops, he
volunteered to fight on the Northern side. He organized the 10th
Kentucky Volunteer Infantry in the fall of 1861 and was commissioned a Colonel 9 His regiment formed part of the original division of General George H. Thomas. Harlan participated in
many engagements. Once he was arrayed against a Confederate
force of which Mr. Justice Lurton was then a youthful member.
Harlan rose rapidly in rank and in 1863 was appointed Acting
Commander of a Brigade. But he resigned his military commission in the spring of 1863 even though his name was just then
before the U. S. Senate for confirmation as a Brigadier-General
of the Volunteers. In his letter of resignation to General Rosecrans
he said:
I deeply regret that I am compelled at this time,
to return to civilian life. It was my fixed purpose to remain
in the Federal army until it had effectually suppressed the
existing armed rebellion, and restored the authority of the
national government over every part of the nation. No
ordinary consideration would have induced me to depart
from this purpose. Even the private interest to which I have
alluded [his father's death] would be regarded as nothing,
in my estimation, if I felt that my continuance in or retirement from the service would, to any material extent, affect
the great struggle through which the country is now passing.
If, therefore, I am permitted to retire from the army, I
beg the Commanding General to feel assured that it is from
no want of confidence either in the justice or ultimate tri928 Case and Com. 120 (1916). Harlan was also reported to have been
commissioned a Captain of the Zouaves in July 1861, according to the 'Proceedings of the Supreme Court at the Death of Justice Harlan," 222 U.S. XII
(1912); but the writer has been unable to find collateral evidence to support the
statement. It is doubtful that he ever served with these volunteer regiments.
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umph of the Union cause. That cause will always have the
warmest sympathy of my heart, for there are no conditions
upon which I will consent to a dissolution of the Union.
Nor are there any concessions, consistent with the republican form of government, which I am not prepared to make
in order to maintain and perpetuate that Union. 10
It has been generally felt that his resignation was directly
induced by his father's death, necessitating his return to private
life; but there are some who claim that he resigned to enter
politics and oppose the military regime. Upon his return to
civilian life Harlan received the Constitutional Union Party's
unanimous nomination for the office of Attorney-General of Kentucky; he was successful in the following election. In the presidential election of 1864, Harlan took the stump in support of
General George McClellan and bitterly criticized Lincoln's Administration. He opposed the Thirteenth Amendment, declaring
that he would combat it on principle "if there were not a dozen
slaves in Kentucky". He considered the abolition of slavery by
federal action "a flagrant invasion of the right of sell-government" and a violation of the promises which had been made to
Kentucky slave-holders." Harlan himself continued to hold
slaves until he was forced to free them. However, in the campaign
of 1868, Harlan swung completely over into the opposition camp,
firmly espousing the Republican party and supporting Grant. By
now he defended the war amendments as necessary to the reconstruction of the Union.
Harlan's active entrance into national affairs was marked by
the part which he took in the Cincinnati Republican Convention
of 1876. For the first time since 1860 there was genuine uncertainty as to who would be chosen as the Republican standardbearer. There had been talk about a third term for Grant. However, in the spring of 1875 the Pennsylvania Republican state convention had passed a resolution against a third term in which
most of the other states acquiesced. With Grant out of the way,
the field was wide open. Of the potential candidates, most discussed were James G. Blaine of Maine, Roscoe Conkling of New
York, Benjamin H. Bristow of Kentucky, and Oliver P. Morton of
10 Supra

note 9.

11 Coulter, The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky 279 (1926).
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Indiana. In addition there were some "favorite sons," prominent
among whom was Rutherford B. Hayes of Ohio. 2
Blaine seemed to have the best chance of securing the coveted
nomination. He was certain of the support of Maine and of
enough votes in other states to give him a decided lead over any
of the other candidates. Senator Conkling would naturally have
the support of most of the delegates from his own state of New
York, and was generally believed to be the candidate favored by
the Administration. Senator Morton was not favorably looked
upon by the reform elements of the party. He was loyally supported by Indiana; and he was so popular with the Negroes of the
South that an especially called national convention of that race
at Nashville, in April 1876, showed itself almost unanimous in his
favor.

13

Of all the candidates, Bristow was apparently the man best
fitted to lead a campaign whose watch-words should be "Reform
within the Party." As Secretary of the Treasury he had conducted
relentless warfare against the Whiskey Ring, had not hesitated to
secure the conviction of personal friends of the President, and
had even ventured to bring about the indictment and trial of
Orville E. Babcock, the President's private secretary. By his
activity he had, however, gained the ill-will of the President and
of the Radical official coterie, and had been "blackballed" by the
New York Union League Club. On the other hand, he was regarded with favor by the reformers and was supported by a large
part of the more reputable Republican press. 4
The "favorite son" candidate most frequently mentioned was
Hayes, who had been strongly indorsed by his home state of
Ohio. He was then serving a third term as its governor. He was
sound on the money question, had a good war record, was without any important enemies, but was not well known outside his
own state. His chances of nomination were considered slight.
The Republican convention met at Cincinnati. The meeting
place was regarded as especially favorable to Bristow, for the
delegates were more enthusiastic for him than they were for
Hayes, and the city was also easily accessible to Kentuckians.
Harlan nominated Bristow.
12 Hayworth, The Disputed Presidential Election of 1876, 11 (1906).
13 Id. at 13.
14 Id. at 14.
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On the first four ballots the total number of votes cast varied
from 754 to 755. Blaine received from 285-292, with 378 constituting the necessary majority. Bristow's highest count, on the
other hand, was only 126. The strenuous support given to Blaine
had now thoroughly convinced the supporters of the other candidates that he was the real enemy. Many of the party leaders,
knowing that a bolt would take place should he be the nominee,
began to cast about for some candidate in whose favor a combination could be made. The reformers had convinced Conkling's
followers that he could not be nominated; the same applied to
Morton and Hartratft, a favorite son from Pennsylvania. This left
Bristow and Hayes as the only possible anti-Blaine nominees.
On the fifth ballot a decided shift toward Hayes became
evident; his vote increased from 68 to 104. On the sixth ballot,
however, a Blaine stampede began. He received 308 votes, and
thus came within 70 votes of the nomination. On the same ballot
Hayes gained only 9 to bring his total to 118; Morton received 85;
Bristow 111; Conkling 81; and Hartrauft 50.15
The seventh ballot seemed to be decisive: at first, Blaine's total
increased rapidly, and it was apparent that if he continued to
gain at the same rate he would be nominated. When Indiana
was called, the chairman of the delegation withdrew the name of
Morton, and cast 25 votes for Hayes and 5 for Bristow. The
crucial moment in the roll call came when Kentucky was reached.
Since it had become evident that Bristow could not be nominated,
Kentucky withdrew his name. Then, moved by the knowledge of
Blaine's hostility to Bristow, the Kentucky delegation, at Harlan's
behest, voted unanimously for Hayes. They were followed by
most of the remaining delegates who had opposed Blaine, with
the result that Hayes received 884 votes and the nomination.,
As the future President, Hayes sought to reward Harlan for
his convention efforts by offering him the Attorney-Generalship,
a position Harlan desired. This, however, was considered to be
inexpedient by Hayes' advisors due to Harlan's contfoversial role
as a member of the much discussed Louisiana Commission of
1876; this commission had investigated the dispute arising out
of the famous election of that year. Instead, Harlan was offered
a diplomatic post, which he declined.
15 Id. at 24.
lo ibid.
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But on October 16, 1877, Hayes appointed John Marshall
Harlan to the Supreme Court to fill the vacancy caused by the
resignation of Mr. Justice David Davis some time earlier-an appointment that was at the time regarded as a payment for political
service rendered.
IlI
The years during which Justice Harlan served on the Supreme
Court represent one of the most important periods in the history
of the United States. The era of reconstruction following the
close of the Civil War had passed; this country had embarked
upon an unparalleled era of prosperity and industrial development.
The enormous extension of the railway system, resulting in
over 300 times as much track in 1890 as in 1877, and the organization of immense corporations, formed by the consolidation of
rival companies, aroused the entire country and the Congress to
the perils of monopoly. The first step toward the federal regulation of the railroads was consequently taken by the passage of the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. This period of time also witnessed the initial attempts toward regulation and suppression of
trusts and monopolies by the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Law of 1890. Justice Harlan's decisions, insisting upon a construction that would carry out the apparent intent of Congress,
gave rise to some of his most famous opinions.
InterstateCommerce Power
The first important case construing the Act of 1887 was Texas
and Pacific Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission. 7
Here the question was whether under the Interstate Commerce
Act the railroad company could legally charge a cheaper rate for
shipments of goods from foreign ports through the territory of
the United States than it did between two equally distant places
within the United States. The Interstate Commerce Commission
held that there had been an unlawful discrimination. The Supreme Court reversed the finding of the Commission and held
that it had exceeded the powers given it by Congress. Justice
Harlan dissented, contending that the decision by the Court
17 162 U.S. 197, 289 (1896).
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legitimatized partiality to foreign shippers as opposed to those
at home. He also felt that the ICC gave the only proper interpretation of the Act of Congress, either as to its meaning or as
to the intent of the legislators.
In ICC v. Alabama Midland RailroadCompany, 8 the Supreme
Court decided that in attempting to fix rates the commission had
exceeded the powers granted to it by Congress. Again, Justice
Harlan disagreed with the majority-decision because it evidently
deprived the ICC of its ability to prevent discrimination in rates:
Taken in connection with other decisions defining the
powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the present decision, it seems to me, goes far to make that commission a useless body for all practical purposes, and to defeat many of the important objects designed to be accomplished by the various enactments of Congress relating to
interstate commerce . .. It [the Commission] is denied
many of the powers which, in my judgment, were intended
to be conferred upon it.
As a direct result of the decisions in the above cases, in which
the Court decided that the Commission did not have the regulatory power which it thought it possessed and sought to exercise,
Congress amended the ICC Act so as to give it the powers contended for by Justice Harlan in his dissents.
Sherman Anti-Trust Law Cases
Just as the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 was nullified and
emasculated by judicial interpretation, so was-in due course-the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890. The first important case construing the Sherman Act was that of U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co.,19
in which the U. S. Attorney General charged that the American
Sugar Refining Company had, by contracts with four other defendants, gained control of 98 per cent of the manufacture of all
refined sugar in the United States, and so tended to raise prices
and restrict trade. The Court, however, in an eight to one decision, Justice Harlan being the lone dissenter, held that the
statute did not denounce a monopoly in the manufacture of a
necessity of life, such as sugar, but only a monopoly in interstate
and international trade or commerce. The majority further con18 168 U.S. 144, 176 (1897).
19 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895).
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tended that the acquisition by the sugar company of its competitors did not constitute a combination to restrain or monopolize
interstate commerce, because it related solely to the manufacture
of refined sugar in one city and state only, although the product
afterward entered into interstate commerce. In the opinion of
the Court, "Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a
part of it."
Justice Harlan vigorously dissented from these views upon
the ground that the Act of 1890 did not strike simply at the manufacture of articles which are recognized subjects of commerce,
but at combinations that unduly restrain, because they monopolize the buying and selling of articles which are to go into interstate commerce. He contended that the case fell within the
purview of the Act because the sugar controlled by the monopoly,
even though manufactured in one state, entered into interstate
commerce and that to the federal government alone belonged
the power of regulating the interstate relations of corporations
engaged in interstate commerce. He insisted that the states were
powerless to control the interstate operations of giant corporations, and unless the federal government did so there would be
a "twilight zone" wherein no power of regulation could be
exercised. He expressed his views on the scope of the federal
government's power in regard to interstate commerce as follows:
While the states retain, because they have never surrendered, full control of their completely internal traffic, it
was not intended by the framers of the Constitution that
should be excluded from
any part of interstate commerce
20
the control of Congress.
The Sugar Trust opinion for the time being vitiated, in very
large degree, the federal control of trusts and monopolies. The
only successful prosecutions conducted by the government in the
next few years were those directed against railroad rate combinations and labor unions. Since a railroad was in itself a business
directly engaged in interstate commerce, the issue in such cases
was not federal control of production but the regulation on commerce itself and the dictum in U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co. did not apply. Thus in two divided opinions, Justice Harlan voting with the
20d. at 42.
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majority in both cases, given in U. S. v. Trans-MissouriFreight
Association,2 and U. S. v. Joint Traffic Association,22 the Court
held that an "association" formed by several western railroads
to fix rates was monopolistic in character and hence violated the
Sherman Act.
In a unanimous opinion in Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v.
United States,23 the Court took at least one short step toward
recognition of the intimate relationship between commerce and
production. Here it held that a combination entered into by
several pipe manufacturers, which divided the pipe market along
regional geographic lines, and which fixed the prices of pipe
through collusive bidding by members of the combine, had a
direct effect upon interstate commerce and was therefore illegal
under the Sherman Act.
The next important case was that of the Northern Securities
Company v. United States,24 in which Justice Harlan delivered
the opinion of the Court. As the voice of the majority, he asserted
the principles which he had developed in his dissent in the Knight
case. It represented a decision which did much to "revitalize"
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
The suit at issue was against the Hill-Morgan railroad combine, which had arranged to put a stop to competition in the
northern and northwestern sections of the U. S. by controlling
under one head practically all of the railroads in that part of the
country. The question to be determined by the Court was
whether such a combination amounted to a restraint of trade forbidden by the Act of 1890, and whether the U. S. had the power
to command these corporations to refrain from their proposed
combination.
The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Harlan, decided in
favor of the government. Part of the opinion follows very closely
the ideas set down by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v.
Ogden.25 Justice Harlan wrote:
Congress may protect the freedom of interstate
commerce by any means that are appropriate and that are
21 166 U.S. 290 (1897).

22171 U.S. 505 (1898).
23175 U.S. 211 (1899).
24 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
2522 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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lawful, and not prohibited by the Constitution... no state
corporation can stand in the way of the enforcement of the
national will, legally expressed.
The only other cases of importance on this subject in which
Justice Harlan dissented, and with which he practically closed
his career on the bench, were U. S. v. American Tobacco Co.," °
and the Standard Oil Co. v. U. S.1 7 In these cases the Court,
while upholding the Anti-Trust Act in sweeping fashion and decreeing the dissolution of these two powerful trusts, injected the
so-called "rule of reason" into the construction of the Act. The
Court held that the statute only denounced a monopoly where it
was "unreasonable" and there was an "undue" restraint of trade.
Although Justice Harlan concurred in the decisions in these
cases, he dissented sharply from the Court's reading of the word
"unreasonable" into the Act of 1890. He insisted that to do
so
amounted to judicial legislation, and that it read into the AntiTrust Act words not put there by Congress.
The State Police Power
Late in life, drawing on the experience of thirty-four years on
the highest bench, Mr. Justice Harlan summed up the principles
of the state police power which he said were "not open to question":
... [The police power is] the power to so regulate
the relative rights and duties of all within its jurisdiction so
as to guard the public morals, the public safety and the public health, as well as to promote the public convenience and
the common good; and that it is with the State to devise the
means to be employed to such ends, taking care that the
means devised do not go beyond the necessities of the case,
have some real or substantial relation to tho objects to be
accomplished, and are not inconsistent with its own constitution or the Constitution of the United States ....
s (Emphasis supplied)
But what is included in the public health, safety, morals,
convenience and common good? Harlan expressed his approval
of many state statutes in a variety of fields including alcoholic
beverages, compulsory vaccination, the use of the flag of the
26221 U.S. 106 (1911).
27 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
28 House v. Mayes, 219 U.S. 270, 282 (1911).
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United States, running of freight trains on Sunday, monopoly in
the insurance business, zoning, charter of a fertilizer manufacturing company and the manufacture of oleomargarine.
Strongly opposed to "judicial legislation", 9 Harlan maintained
it was for the Legislature, not the Court, to determine the need
for legislation in any area. Upholding a Pennsylvania statute
prohibiting the manufacture of oleomargarine he wrote:
If all that can be said of this legislation is that it is unwise,
or unnecessarily oppressive ... their appeal must be to the
Legislature, or to the ballot-box, not to the judiciary. The
latter cannot interfere without usurping
powers committed
30
to another department of government.
In legislative areas which may belong to the national government, but where Congress has not acted, he held that the state
legislatures may exercise their police power. Moreover, in the
area of liquor prohibition, he felt that only the states could
exercise effective control.
As if to underline these views, expressed in the dissent in
which Justice Harlan joined in Leisy v. Hardin,3 Congress passed
the Wilson Act in 1891, which provided that imports of alcoholic
beverages were subject to the laws of the state enacted in the
exercise of its police powers in the same manner as they applied
to domestic liquors.3 2
Upholding an Ohio statute requiring passenger stops of interstate railroad trains, 33 Harlan quoted his previous opinion in Hennington v. Georgia:
...the legislative enactments of the States, passed under
their admitted police powers . . . are to be respected
in the courts of the Union until they are superseded and displaced by some act of Congress passed in execution of the
power granted to it by the Constitution. Local laws of the
character mentioned have their source in the powers which
the States reserved and never surrendered to Congress...34
(Emphasis supplied)
29See the discussion in Abraham, "John Marshall Harlan: A Justice Neglected," 41 Va. L. Rev. 876 (1955).
3 Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 686 (1888).
31

135 U.S. 100, 125 (1890).

3"Dowling and Edwards, American Constitutional Law 408 (1954).
33Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry v. Ohio, 173 U.S. 285, 291 (1899).
34 Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299, 317 (1896).
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Thus it is apparent that in this period of American industrial
and territorial expansion, the Court and Harlan emphasized the
position of state police power. So much importance did Harlan
attach to the police power that he believed, with the Court, that
states could not bargain away the police power to mushrooming
enterprises eager to secure valuable franchises and concessionsfertilizer companies, lotteries, beer and liquor companies, gas
utilities, railroad companies and the like. 35 Further the Court
warned these companies that the constitutional provision against
the impairment of their contracts would not bar the exercise at
some future date of the state police power. 36
One of Harlan's first concerns was with the actual effect of
the legislation before him as well as with the intent of the legislature. If, as in the so-called Minnesota meat inspection statute,
the effect of the legislation was to prohibit the importation of
fresh meat into the state, that statute was held repugnant to the
Commerce clause.37 And in throwing-out a similar Virginia law
he wrote:
[A state] may not, under the guise of exerting its police
powers, or of enacting inspection laws, make discriminations against the products and industries of some of the
States in favor of the products and industries of its owm
or of other States.38
Although Harlan supported the positive use of the state police
power he nonetheless held to a broad, national interpretation of
the powers of the federal government. Where state statutes excluded products of other states or discriminated against out-ofstate corporations he held them to be unconstitutional as repugnant to the commerce clause. For example, a Louisiana
quarantine statute upheld by the Court, forbade the "interstate
shipment" of cattle between Texas and Louisiana because of
anthrax in Texas. To Harlan this was an unjustifiable burden on
all shipment of cattle and an improper burden on interstate com39
merce.
35 Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488 (1897) (opinion by Harlan); Stone v.
Mississippi,
101 U.S. (11 Otto) 814 (1879).
3
6 Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878).
3
7 Minnesota v. Barber, 186 U.S. 313 (1890).
38
Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 82 (1891).
39 Smith v. St. Louis & S.W. R'y Co., 181 U.S. 248, 259 (1901).
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He considered the exaction of wharfage duties by a municipality a "burden on the constitutional privilege of entering the
port of any city,"40 and the Tennessee tax on the out-of-state business of an out-of-state corporation with a warehouse in Tennessee
"a clever device . . . to sustain its government by taxation upon
interstate commerce."4 1 But when the Court held unconstitutional an attempt by Texas to collect a one per cent tax on gross
receipts from interstate railroad lines he said the tax was valid
as
42
an occupation tax upon business within the State of Texas.
Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Harlan was not willing to say that
at all times the commerce power should transcend the state police
power. According to his rule of thumb, police power should
prevail over commerce if the statute in question affected commerce "only incidentally, to some extent or for a limited time or
in a limited degree". In his dissenting opinion supporting an Iowa
prohibition on the sale and import of intoxicating liquor he
wrote:
The reserved power of the States to guard the health,
morals and safety of their people is more vital to the existence of society, than their power in respect to trade and
commerce
having no possible connection with those subjects.43
In all of the cases on this subject Mr. Justice Harlan, whether
agreeing or dissenting, stood resolutely for the freedom of commerce and the rights of citizens of other states. He seemed to feel
that the commerce clause and Article I, Section 10, were two of
the chief compromises of the Constitution, striking as they did
at the vexatious statutes which the colonies had enacted to discourage the importation of articles competing with their own
products. While he upheld inspection laws and other similar
enactments when they appeared to have been enacted in good
faith, and for the purpose of promoting commerce, he was quick
to express his disapproval of such as appeared to have been
enacted for the ulterior purpose of discriminating against commerce from other states.
4

"Transportation Co. v. Parkesburg, 107 U.S. 691, 707, 710 (1882).
Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing District, 145 U.S. 1, 24, 28 (1892).
Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio R'y. Co. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 228

41
42

(1908).
43

Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern R'y Co., 125 U.S. 465, 524 (1888).

KNTucKY LAw JouNAL[

[Vol. 46,

Harlan brought the same respect for substance to his consideration of that other, equally thorny, conflict between the state
police power and the rights guaranteed under the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Up until the Civil War the all-important defense of property rights was rooted in the contract
clause of the Constitution dealing with the impairment of contracts. After the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, "deprivation of property without due process" and alleged "denial of
equal protection" found their way into certiorari petitions filed
before the Court on behalf of commercial and industrial interests.
In Smyth v. Ames, the celebrated Nebraska rate case, Mr.
Justice Harlan found that the rates fixed by the Nebraska statute
were so low that the railroad companies had suffered an actual
loss in the years 1891-98. The law kept the railroads from receiving reasonable and just compensation thereby deprihing
them of property without due process of law and of the equal
protection of the laws.44
Upholding an Alabama regulation of combination and monopoly in the fire insurance business he found that a provision
where policyholders were entitled to recover 25 per cent above

the amount of the policy did not deprive the companies, members
of a rate association, of property without due process. 45 He said
that the Farm Drainage Act of Illinois was a proper exercise of
the police power, that the railroad had to replace at its own ex-

pense a bridge as part of a swamp drainage scheme of public
improvement, and that the cost of replacement could not be
construed as a deprivation of property without due process.",

He concurred in Justice Peckham's opinion that zoning laws do
not deny a property owner equal protection of the laws when they
4
establish commercial and residential classifications of the city.

In another dissent joined by Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice
Day, and supported, separately, by Mr. Justice Holmes, he held
that the New York regulation of maximum hours of work in
bakeries did not violate freedom of contract guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that the decision of the Court
44 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).

45 German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Hale, 219 U.S. 307 (1911).
46 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R'y Co. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage Commissioners, 200 U.S. 561 (1906).
47

Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
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"would seriously cripple the inherent power of the States to care
48
for the lives, health and well-being of their citizens.
While Harlan's most vigorous and fervent opinions were written in defense of civil rights and civil liberties, his concept of the
scope of the state police power and the federal-state relationship
is a further contribution to the evolution of constitutional law.
Taxing
justice Harlan's views on the taxing power of a state were
interestingly manifested in the case of Ficklen v. Shelby County
Taxin a District.4" Shelby County, Tennessee, imposed a license
fee and a tax on the profits of a representative of an out-of-state
concern. The Court upheld the county tax and fee even though
Ficklen's profits were derived from interstate business. Harlan
in dissenting argued that since Ficklen's business was purely
interstate, the county could not tax or impose a fee on the profits
of the said business.
The problem of what constitutes direct taxation faced the
Court in the case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company2 'J A majority of the Court decided that a law that levied
taxes on income from real estate and from personal property constituted direct taxation, and thereby held the recently enacted
Federal Income Tax Act unconstitutional. Harlan in dissenting,
argued-and it was one of his most vehement, most publicized
dissents-that "a tax on income derived from real property ought
not to be, and until now has never been, regarded by any court
as a direct tax on such property within the meaning of the Constitution." Harlan correctly warned that the effect of the Court's
decision would be to make a constitutional amendment necessary for the imposition of an income tax.
Racial Segregation
All of Harlan's spirit and concern for the Constitution pour
forth with renewed vigor in his most famous dissents, dealing
with human rights in those cases in which the Supreme Court "by
a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism sacrificed the substance
-'
and the spirit of the recent amendments of the Constitution.
4

8 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65, 73 (1905).
49 145 U.S. 1, 24 (1892).

GO157 U.S. 429; 158 U.S. 601, 638, 665 (1895).
51 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883).

KENTucEy LAw JouNALV.

[Vol. 46,

Mr. Justice Harlan's opposition to racial segregation first came
to attention in Plessy v. Ferguson.52 As the only dissenter in this
case and, paradoxically, the lone Southerner then on the bench, he
brought into question the general purpose of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments:
In respect of civil rights, common to all citizens,
the Constitution of the United States does not, I think, permit any public authority to know the race of those entitled
to be protected in the enjoyment of such rights. Every true
man has pride of race. ... Finally, and to the end that no
citizen should be denied, on account of his race, the privilege of participating in the political control of his country,
it was declared by the Fifteenth Amendment that "the right
of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged ... on53account of race, color or previous condition of servitude".
One of Justice Harlan's statements in Plessy v. Fergusonhas come
to be an especially famous one, its doctrine achieving its most
recent attention through the 1954 public school segregation cases,
almost 60 years later:
Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. 54
Justice Harlan expressed deep concern for racial minorities,
especially for the Negro, but also for the Chinese,5 5 and American
Indian.5 6 Harlan's dissents in Berea College v. Kentucky,"7 the
9 and two railroad
Civil Rights Cases,58 Giles v. Harris,"
"Jim
Crow" cases, covered additional aspects of the problem. Of these,
Harlan considered his dissent in the Civil Rights Cases6" as his
most notable. Here, the majority of the Court held that Congress
had no power under the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the
Negro against discrimination practiced by individuals. Harlan
152Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
53 Id. at 554, 555.
54 Id. at 559.
55 Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 694 (1887); and Chew Heong v. United
States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
56 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 110 (1884).
57211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908).
58 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883).
59 189 U.S. 475, 493 (1903).
60 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883).
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believed, however, that precisely such protection was the intent
of the framers of the amendment.
Citizenship in this country necessarily imports at least
equality of civil rights among citizens of every race in
the same State. It is fundamental in American citizenship
that, in respect of such rights, there shall be no discrimination by the State, or its officers, or by individuals or corporations exercising public functions or authority, against any
citizen because of his race or previous condition of servitude.61
In the two "Jim Crow" cases dealing with both interstate
commerce and segregation of races, Harlan was clearly opposed
to the seemingly contradictory doctrine rendered by the Court's
majority. He failed to see how the Court, after refusing a few
years before to uphold a Louisiana statute forbidding the separation of races on carriers within the state, 2 could uphold Kentucky
and Mississippi statutes requiring separation, 3 on the basis that
the first case involved interference with interstate commerce
while the last two did notl
Later cases on racial segregation demonstrated clearly, in one
way or another, the basic ideas that were present in all of Harlan's
dissents regarding civil rights. He felt that the Thirteenth Amendment meant much more than mere exemption from actual slavery;
to him it represented far more than simply preventing one person
from owning another as property. He contended that the people,
in adding the Thirteenth Amendment, could not have intended
simply to destroy the institution of slavery, then remit those who
had been set free to the states which had held them in bondage,
and then also expect those states to protect them in the rights
which necessarily grew out of the freedom that those very states
evidently did not desire them to have. Harlan held, consequently,
that the adoption of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
necessarily gave freedom which involved affirmative immunity
from, and protection against, all discrimination because of race,
in respect of such civil rights as belong to free men of other races.
Harlan thus refused to deny to Congress the legislative au61 Id. at 48.
2 Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 485 (1878).
63Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388 (1900); Louisville,
N.O. & T. By. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890).
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thority to define and regulate the entire body of civil rights which
citizens are supposed to possess and enjoy. In his judgment, he
was simply advocating the existence of free men in our society,
based on his belief in the role of the Constitution as the people's
instrument for the attainment of the basic rights which were intended for them by the authors of that document.
Civil Liberties
While Harlan's statements from Plessy v. Fergusonhave come
to general notice recently in connection with racial questions, his
expressions on other aspects of civil liberties also deserve attention.
Some of the most critical questions presented to the Court
just before and during Justice Harlan's occupancy of the high
bench appeared to center on the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Did the Amendment confer on the federal government the power to enforce upon the states restrictions similar to
those in the first eight amendments, which relate only to the
federal government's power? It was a clearly joined issue: One
side saw the amendment as only conferring the power on the
federal government to prevent state actions when the privileges
or immunities "owe their existence to the federal government, its
National character, its Constitution, or its laws". 4 The opposing
view, championed by Justice Harlan, was that the privileges
and immunities concerned "embrace at least those expressly recognized by the Constitution . . . and placed beyond the power of

Congress to take away or impair."65
Justice Harlan came to the Court after a pattern of decision
on these questions had already been set. In the Slaughter House
Cases,"0 decided in 1878-four years prior to his appointment to
the bench-the Court had rejected the claim that power was conferred on the federal government through the Fourteenth Amendment to review the actions of states in the broad areas of personal
and property rights outlined in the first eight amendments. It
said that the effect of such a doctrine would be:
64justice Miller in the Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79

(1873).

65 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 606 (1900).
0083 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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... to bring within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively
to the States. ... [The effect of] so great a departure from
the structure and spirit of our institutions ... is to fetter and
degrade the State governments by subjecting them to the
control of Congress...67

Justice Harlan spoke forcibly on his position that the Supreme
Court could not select the types of rights which it believed the
Fourteenth Amendment was to protect. He stood for including
all the rights enumerated as guaranteed in the first eight amendments. All these rights, therefore, would be in the orbit of federal
protection against encroachment by the states. Among these
rights is that requiring indictment by a grand jury.
In the words of Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in
Hurtadov. People of California:
My brethern concede that there are principles of
liberty and justice, lying at the foundation of our civil and
political institutions, which no State can violate consistently
with that due process of law required by the 14th Amendment in proceeding involving life, liberty or property. Some
of these principles are enumerated in the opinion of the
court. But, for reasons which do not impress my mind as
satisfactory, they exclude from that enumeration the exemption from prosecution,
by information, for a public
68
offense involving life.
A similar question occurred in Maxwell v. Dow. 9 In this dissent, Justice Harlan inveighed against the idea that the Court
could select those areas of rights in which federal protection
would be afforded and those areas in which state protection would
be the only available recourse. He said that all the rights of the
Bills of Bights:
are equally protected by the Constitution. No judicial tribunal has authority to say that some of them may be
abridged by the States while others may not be abridged.
...
If some of the guarantees of life, liberty and property
which at the time of the adoption of the National Constitution were regarded as fundamental and as absolutely essential to the enjoyment of freedom, have in the judgment
67 Id. at 77, 78.
68 110 U.S. 516, 546 (1884).
69 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
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of some ceased to be of practical value, it is for the people
of the United States so to declare by an amendment of that
instrument ... 70
Another important civil right is that concerned with immunity
against self-incrimination. In Twining v. New Jersey, Justice
Harlan would not concede that this privilege was not granted
federal protection against state violation by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1
A question of freedom of the press arose in another case, Patterson v. Colorado.72 This involved the question of publication of
material critical of a court during the process of a trial. Justice
Harlan delivered a powerful rebuke to his colleagues who had
held that while "previous restraints" cannot be practiced upon
the-press, subsequent punishment may be justified:
...As the First Amendment guaranteed the rights
of free speech and of a free press against hostile action by
the United States, it would seem clear that when the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the States from impairing or
abridging the privileges of citizens of the United States it
necessarily prohibited the States from impairing or abridging the constitutional rights of such citizens to free speech
and a free press. . .. 73
Except for the health issue involved, it would appear somewhat out of keeping with Justice Harlan's usual role that he wrote
the majority opinion which upheld the right of a state to impose
a compulsory vaccination law. But in Jacobson v. Massachuetts,7 '
he wrote that such a requirement was admissible and would be in
violation of constitutional guarantees only if it was "beyond all
question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law ..

IV
"Solitude is the fate of great men." With these words Windelband opened the chapter on Immanuel Kant in his History of
Modern Philosophy. Justice Harlan was basically a solitary man.
Even if he was not an object of malice among his colleagues he
70

Id. at 616, 617.

71211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908).

72 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
73 Id. at 464.
74 197 U.S. 11, 81 (1905).
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was nonetheless a superb individualist and remained steadfastly
independent in his thinking and judgment. Thus he, as well as
Holmes, has been called the "Great Dissenter." 75 His two most

celebrated dissenting opinions-judgments that were destined to
become the majority opinion of the U. S. Supreme Court many
decades later-were delivered by himself alone, joined by no one
76

else.

Harlan was a man of sincerity and, in common with most
sincere men, he did not easily compromise. Moreover, he was
remarkably consistent in his attitudes and thus predictable. As
an uncompromising man, he was often militant in his opinion,
even at the risk of standing alone. Indeed, he seemed to be
unafraid of such solitude, and rather might have enjoyed it, for
his individual life was a spiritually full and rich one: ".... each
night he sank into slumber, with 77one hand upon the Bible and
the other upon the Constitution1"

Above all, he was truly a moral person. Three moral qualities
were attributed to him by Chief Justice White: a sense of supreme
importance attached to the duty of justice; his noble purpose to
do justice; and his reverence for the faith in the Constitution. 8
Out of these qualities sprang his humanitarianism "to see to it
79
that the weak were not overmastered by the strong." Out of

them flowed his liberal nationalist creed. He was one of those
few men on the highest bench who represented the integration
of high moral principles into his duty. In a sense he was an
embodiment of the lofty cause for which the Supreme Court
stands.
Thus his philosophy was merely the expression of the above
qualities of his personality. We may classify his philosophy into
two categories: namely, his basic attitude toward the law itself,
and his constitutional doctrine.
Justice Harlan regarded the law as something more than a
mere instrument of expediency. He was first of all reluctant to
invalidate a law unless it was "plainly and palpably" in conflict
75 See Abraham, "John Marshall Harlan: A Justice Neglected," 41 Va. L. Rev.
871 7(1955).
OPlessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896); United States v. E. C.
Knight
7 Co., 156 U.S. 1, 18 (1895).
787 As quoted in Abraham, supra note 75 at 875.
Proceeding on the death of Mr. Justice Harlan, 222 U.S. XXVI (1912).
79 Ibid.
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with the Constitution. He took a firm position against "judicial
legislation." On the bench, he was a moral person called upon to
uphold the ideals of the Constitution. Off the bench, however, he
was a realist who knew the pragmatic significance of the actions
of the Court. He was, when off the bench, a shrewd practical
man with many diverse interests. His opinions often reflected this
aspect of his personality. Yet, basically, his chief concern was the
law, as set forth in the Constitution and legislative enactments.
But when it comes to just what it is that makes the law, his view
was unique and clear: It is the "internal sense," the "intent" of
the law and not its letter that counts:
"It is not the words of the law but the internal sense of it
that makes the law: the letter of the law is the body; the
sense and reason of the law is the soul."8 '
[F]ull effect [should] be given to the intent with
2 which...
[the constitutional provisions] were adopted.
If, since John Marshall, the practice of judges is to look into
the legislative intent for a guide to the sound construction of
a law, then Justice Harlan lifted this practice to the level of
a philosophical principle. Thus, it was not because of his captivity by the letter of the law, but, on the contrary, because of
his respect for its "internal sense" and "reason," that he tried to
"carry-over" the entire first eight amendments of the Constitution
to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He
knew and understood the "intent" of the post-war amendments,
and tried to be true to it. It may be said, therefore, that he, above
all others, had a kind of religious reverence for the Constitution
as the fundamental instrument of the ideals for which American
democracy stands. A fervent Marshall disciple, he keenly sensed
the vital role of the Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution.
Harlan was a militant justice, yet he was by no means extreme
in his judgment. Throughout his service on the bench he tried to
be true to the intent and purpose of the Founding Fathers as he
interpreted them in his best conscience. Thus, whenever possible, he upheld the state legislatures in matters of social and eco80

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 68 (1905).
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883).
82 Tbid.
81
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nomic welfare. But in the matter of interstate commerce he was
consistently nationalistic. He was concerned with the preservation of the constitutional institution, and it was his far-reaching
insight that prompted him to deny the state police power in the
field of interstate commerce under modern economic conditions.
In the field of civil rights he also favored federal actions, for he
regarded the States as too inefficient and at times too reluctant to
give full effect to the "intent" of laws pertaining to civil rights.
Hence, he read not the letter of the "equal protection of the laws"
clause, but its "internal sense", when he declared:
The thin disguise of "equal" accommodations . . . will not
mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong this day done. 83
Thus, instead of getting captivated by the letter of law, he argued,
in the words of Professor Clark, that "when by a logical and grammatical construction a law could be made to correct the evils intended to be remedied by it, . . .this should be done."84 In the
matter of civil rights, he was further invigorated by his moral
principle of humanitarianism. In this he was far ahead of his
colleagues and consequently felt constrained to play the role of
sole dissenter in the famous Plessy v. Ferguson case. 5 And it was
precisely for this moral quality of his personality, his insistence
on respecting the intent and purpose of a law as he saw it, that
his colleagues could not join with him in many cases. Yet it was
this very quality that makes him a great justice four and a half
de':ades after his death.
In general he did not take any extreme position with respect
to the relative powers of federal and state government. If he was
basically nationalistic, he was equally concerned with the reserved
powers of the states. Whenever possible, he favored the state
police power and took an affirmative attitude toward state legislation; yet he was emphatic with regard to national supremacy. His
view on this matter was, again, essentially that of Justice John
Marshall, as expressed in McCulloch v. Maryland.8 The main
difference between him and Marshall would be that the latter
played the role of a constitutional pioneer, while Harlan struggled
83 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896).

84 Clark, The Constitutional Doctrine of Mr. Justice Marshall Harlan 15

(1915).

85 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
80 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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to maintain the torch of Marshall's philosophy in a period of "a
87
very damp season."
Looking back to his achievements one cannot fail to sense
the great debt which the generations after him, as well as the
generations yet to come, owe this solitary dissenter. To the extent that his philosophy contains the touch of immortality, he
will come to be remembered and cherished by his people as long
as American democracy survives.
8

7 Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, Ltd. 89 (1941).

KENTUCKY

LAW JOURNAL
Number 3

Spring, 1958

Vol. 46

EDITORIAL BOARD
1957-1958
LESLIE W. Momus II

JAMEs PAM, JR.

Co-editors-in-Chief
JESSE S. HoGG

Note and Comment Editor
FRED F. BRADLEY

HENRY H. DIcKiNsON

AwRTHu L. BRooKS, JR.

CHARLES E. Goss

H. WENDELL

JOSEPH B. HELM

CHERRY

LINZA B. INABNrr

IRcHARD D. CooPEi

T. P. LEwis

Faculty Editor
FACULTY OF THE COLLEGE OF LAW

ex officio
(MRS.) MARTHA GALLAGHER,

Secretary

The Kentucky Law Journalis published in Fall, Winter, Spring and Summer
by the College of Law, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky. It is entered
as second-class matter October 12, 1927, at the post office, at Lexington, Kentucky,
under the act of March 3, 1879.
Communications of either an editorial or a business nature should be addressed to Kentucky Law Journal, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky.
The purpose of the Kentucky Law Journalis to publish contributions of interest and value to the legal profession, but the views expressed in such contributions
do not necessarily represent those of the Journal.
The Journalis a charter member of the Southern Law Review conference.
$2.00 per number
Subscription price: $4.00 per year

